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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) devices can be exploited
by the attackers as entry points to break into the IoT networks
without early detection. Little work has taken hybrid approaches
that combine different defense mechanisms in an optimal way to
increase the security of the IoT against sophisticated attacks. In
this work, we propose a novel approach to generate the strategic
deployment of adaptive deception technology and the patch
management solution for the IoT under a budget constraint.
We use a graphical security model along with three evaluation
metrics to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the pro-
posed defense mechanisms. We apply the multi-objective genetic
algorithm (GA) to compute the Pareto optimal deployments of
defense mechanisms to maximize the security and minimize the
deployment cost. We present a case study to show the feasibility of
the proposed approach and to provide the defenders with various
ways to choose optimal deployments of defense mechanisms for
the IoT. We compare the GA with the exhaustive search algorithm
(ESA) in terms of the runtime complexity and performance
accuracy in optimality. Our results show that the GA is much
more efficient in computing a good spread of the deployments
than the ESA, in proportion to the increase of the IoT devices.
Index Terms—Cyberdeception; Internet of Things; Graphical
Security Model; Multi-objective Optimization;
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a large-scale network consist-
ing of numerous interacting heterogeneous entities, including
machines and/or humans [28, 27, 33]. IoT devices often face
severe resource constraints (e.g., sensors, mobile devices) in
terms of their energy, computational power, and/or limited
bandwidth. Due to the severe resource constraints, conven-
tional, strong security mechanisms, requiring high computa-
tional overhead, are not applicable. Sophisticated attackers
may easily compromise the IoT devices to penetrate into
a target network and launch more severe attacks later on.
The sophisticated attackers, often called advanced persistent
threat (APT), refer to the attackers that are capable of col-
lecting intelligence about a target, bypass multiple layers of
defense mechanisms, and exploit the target’s vulnerability
to compromise it. In this paper, we consider two defense
mechanisms to increase the security of the IoT networks
and investigate how to deploy these defense mechanisms in
an optimal manner. Such defense mechanisms may include:
(1) deception techniques to divert attackers from real assets;
and (2) security patch management solutions to reduce attack
surface.
Cyberdeception is used to add an additional layer of defense
into conventional security solutions such as intrusion detection
systems (or IDSs), firewalls, and/or endpoint anti-virus soft-
ware. It allows defenders to capture and analyze malicious
behaviors by luring the attackers into a decoy system within
a network and interacting with attackers. As normal users do
not know the existence of the decoy system, defenders will
only get alerts caused by the malicious intrusions. A honeypot
is one of common deception techniques in order to create
a fake asset to protect valuable assets by diverting attack-
ers. However, the management complexity and/or scalability
issues of the honeypots hinder more active usage of them
by enterprises. Modern deception technology employs the
basic honeypot technology with automation techniques, which
allows distributed deployment and update of decoy systems
to achieve adequate coverage and high cost-effectiveness. In
this work, we assume to use the modern deception technology
and aim to evaluate the different ways of deploying decoys
for providing highly cost-effective defense solutions.
Security patches are used to fix software vulnerabilities
to prevent a system from possible exploits with the aim of
reducing attack surface. However, the effective patch solution
has challenged IoT devices. First, many manufacturers sell
the IoT devices with no mechanism in place for automated
patch updates. They are only in favor of usability but often
neglect security in the design phase [19] in order to gain quick
access to the IoT market. This leaves the consumers with
unsupported, vulnerable devices after the purchase. Second,
some IoT devices (e.g., medical devices) use commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) software for the operating system or runtime
environment. Patches for the COTS may not be installed
without validating the patches by the manufacturers. To patch
the IoT devices, the enterprises need to have agreements with
the manufacturers that clarify the obligations for creating and
evaluating the patches for the devices and also testing the
patches for the COTS running on the devices during the
lifecycle support. We will use heterogeneous IoT devices by
different manufacturers and assume that the enterprises make
agreements with the manufacturers to implement security
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patch solutions for the IoT products.
In our prior work [14], we proposed a framework for
modeling and assessing the security of the IoT. The framework
is used to construct a graphical security model and a security
evaluator with various security metrics to automate the security
analysis of the IoT. Graphical security models (e.g., attack
graphs (AGs) [32], attack trees (ATs) [31]) have been widely
used in network security assessment. In particular, an AG
can depict all possible sequences of attackers’ actions to
compromise the target, while an AT explores possible ways an
attack goal is attained by combining different types of attacks.
However, the complexity of computing a complete AG is
increasing exponentially and the construction of the AT is not
scalable as well. Hence, we adopt a scalable graphical security
model called the multi-layer hierarchical attack representation
model (HARM) [17, 14] which combines AGs and ATs to
solve the complexity and scalability issues introduced by
single-layered security models.
To compute the optimal deployments of defense mecha-
nisms, we use multi-layered HARM to evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of the proposed deployment of the defense
mechanisms and apply the multi-objective genetic algorithm
(MOGA) to maximize network security while minimizing
deployment cost. To the best of our knowledge, this work
is the first that evaluates the combinations of the deception
technology and the security patch solution and identifies an
optimal setting to deploy these defense mechanisms for the IoT
environments. This work has the following key contributions:
• We developed a hybrid defense mechanism by combining
the deception technology and software patch solution
for the IoT environments and evaluated the proposed
approach based on the graphical security model and
security metrics.
• We identified an optimal setting to deploy the devel-
oped defense mechanisms for the IoT under resource
constraints. In this work, given the resource budget
constraints, we solved an multi-objective optimization
(MOO) problem using a genetic algorithm (GA) and
compared its performance against the performance of the
exhaustive search algorithm (ESA) as a baseline model.
• The proposed defense mechanism is generic in that it
provides various ways of deploying defense mechanisms
for the resource constrained IoT environments. Our pro-
posed scheme is highly customizable to optimize multiple
objectives to meet given system requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work on security optimization solutions and
deception technology used for an IoT environment. Section III
describes our system model, defense mechanisms, and attack
model considered in this work. Section IV addresses our
problem formulation and optimization steps to solve a given
MOO problem followed by a case study in Section V. Sec-
tion VI demonstrates our experimental results and discusses
their overall trends. Section VII discusses the applicability
and limitations of our work and future work directions. Lastly,
Section VIII concludes our paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Security optimization for IoT: Little work has addressed
a problem on how to optimally select defense mechanisms
for the IoT. Rullo et al. [30] developed a resource allocation
mechanism to ensure the security of the IoT based on an a
Stackelberg game. Based on the decisions from the attack-
defense game, this work derived the best security resource
allocation plan to achieve multiple system goals in terms of
minimizing maximal risk, maximal criticality, energy con-
sumption, and allocation cost. Rullo et al. [29] also took
another approach to develop an optimal security resource
allocation for an IoT network with mobile nodes based on
GAs. Both works [30, 29] assume that an attacker can proceed
a next attack after it can compromise a security resource.
However, it is not realistic as highly sophisticated, stealthy
attackers can directly compromise other components of a
system while not being detected. Further, these works focus on
device-level security but do not concern system-level security.
Cyber deception in IoT: La et al. [20] introduced a game
theoretic model to analyze the security of honeypot-enabled
IoT networks. They assumed that the attacker may deceive
the defender with suspicious or seemingly normal traffic
and used the honeypot-enabled intrusion detection component
which reroutes the suspicious traffic to the honeypots as
a defense mechanism. The interaction between the attacker
and defender was modeled based on a Bayesian game with
incomplete information. Anirudh et al. [9] used honeypots
for online servers to mitigate Distributed-Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks launched from the IoT devices. Pa et al. [25]
developed an IoT honeypot to emulate the IoT devices and
capture Telnet-based attacks and designed the IoT sandbox to
analyze these attacks against the IoT devices running different
CPU architectures. Dowling et al. [13] created a honeypot that
simulates a ZigBee gateway and used it to capture attacks for
a further analysis.
Based on our literature review, no prior work has evaluated
the performance of the modern deception technology on the
IoT and proposed the hybrid approach combining different
defense mechanisms to enhance the security of the IoT via
graphical security models. In this work, we propose a graphical
security model to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of
the defense mechanisms using our devised evaluation met-
rics and identify optimal deployment solutions based on an
MOGA.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe our system model along with
defense mechanisms and attack model considered in this work.
A. System Model
We consider an IoT network consisting of servers, client
machines (e.g., computers), and IoT devices [15, 28]. We
assume that traditional defense mechanisms are in place on the
IoT network, including IDSs, firewalls, and anti-virus software
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on the servers and client machines. The IoT network has a
central patch management system to patch critical security
vulnerabilities in the servers and client machines. This work
focuses on how to deploy the deception technology in the
network and the patch management solution for the IoT
devices to defend against sophisticated attacks, as described in
Section III-C. The assumptions are made based on the realistic
deployment scenario of the IoT network in the smart hospi-
tal [4]. We detail the example network scenario in Section V-A.
B. Defense Mechanisms
We use two defense mechanisms, including the deception
technology and security patch management solution, and their
strategic deployment for adaptive defense based on the combi-
nation of those two defense mechanisms for the targeted IoT.
1) Deception Technologies: Once attackers are inside an
IoT network, they start probing to collect information to
identify potential valuable assets and then move laterally in
the network to launch attacks based on the information they
gathered during the reconnaissance [8]. To successfully lure
attackers, the following issues should be discussed: (1) where
the decoy systems should be deployed; (2) what types of
decoys should be employed; and (3) what level of authenticity
of the decoys should be applied. In this section, we discuss
these issues and the associated purchase cost associated with
each deployment method.
Modern deception technologies integrate honeypot technol-
ogy, visualization, and automation technologies. There are
several emerging vendors (e.g., Illusive Networks, Attivo Net-
works, TrapX, Cymmetria, TopSpin [26]) which implement
the modern deception technologies as well as provide support
for IoT networks in various domains (e.g., smart home, smart
office, health care).
There are two types of decoys/traps utilized throughout
a network: emulation-based and full operating system (OS)-
based. Both emulation-based and full OS-based decoys can
be autonomously created to fit within the environment with
no changes to the existing IT infrastructure. They provide
various types of interactive capabilities. Emulated decoys
allow defenders to create a variety of fake assets (e.g., IoT
devices, endpoints, servers, routers) and to provide a large-
scale coverage across the network. Full OS-based decoys
allow replication of the actual production devices to increase
the possibility of engaging the attacker and to reveal the
attacker’s intention. To increase the overall chances attackers
access decoys, the combinations of the decoys should closely
resemble the real usage of the network devices and guarantee
the decoy diversity. In addition, the decoys are suggested to
be deployed in every VLAN of the network.
Deception technologies are implemented in different ways
by different vendors [1, 2, 3, 7]. The implementation usually
consists of an intelligence center and various types of decoys.
The intelligence center is used to create, deploy, and update a
distributed decoy system, provide automated attack analysis,
vulnerability assessment, and forensic reporting, and integrate
with other prevention systems (e.g., security incident and event
management platform, firewalls) to block attacks. The decoy
system includes the decoys deployed across the network. The
intelligence center can be purchased as a platform including
hardware appliances and/or software. The decoys can be
purchased individually with an annual license fee based on
the number of servers, client machines, and IoT devices to be
protected.
2) Patch Management: The IoT network often consists of
various types of IoT devices produced by different manu-
facturers. The enterprises have annual maintenance contracts
with these manufacturers for repairing and upgrading services.
However, there is no patch management solution for the IoT
devices. Therefore, for each type of the IoT devices, the
enterprises can make additional annual agreements with the
manufacturers for the patch management solutions with a
certain amount of investment. In real-world situations, more
complex cases may happen. For instance, different IoT devices
produced by the same manufacturer can get the patch sup-
port in one contract. But some manufacturers cannot provide
patches for the IoT devices. However, this work proposes an
approach that provides an optimal selection of deployments
of defense mechanisms. We leave the other issues mentioned
above to be addressed in our future work.
C. Attacker Model
We mainly concern an outside attacker in this work. The
attacker aims to obtain private information from an IoT
network and sell it for its economic gain. Considering the
real-world scenarios where attackers target a smart hospital
environment [4], we consider the following attack behaviors:
• An attacker lacks knowledge on whether a decoy system
exists or not. The attacker’s capability to detect the decep-
tion depends on the knowledge gap between the attacker
and the real system state. A smart attacker is assumed to
have a high capability to recognize an emulated decoy but
may not be able to detect a full OS-based decoy easily.
• After the attacker interacted with a decoy, the attacker’s
behavior is monitored. If the attacker realized that the
device is a decoy, it terminates its activities with the decoy
immediately and attempts to find a new target to get into
the network.
• An attacker is capable of identifying exploitable, un-
patched vulnerabilities or unknown vulnerabilities and
compromising the vulnerable servers and/or client ma-
chines [10].
• An attacker is capable of exploiting unpatched vulnerabil-
ities through hidden malware (e.g., re-packing, polymor-
phism) and using them to compromise other devices (e.g.,
installation of the backdoors for persistent attacks) [4].
IV. OPTIMAL DEFENSE DEPLOYMENT
In this section, we discuss our problem formulation and the
steps to optimize the deployment of defense mechanisms.
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A. Problem Formulation
We define a deployment vector as the problem input and
three metrics to evaluate the optimality and efficiency (or
cost) of the deployment and define the following optimization
problem.
We use the definitions of an IoT network and the graphical
security model in our prior work [14] and describe decoy
nodes. The IoT network can be defined as IoT = (S, T , V )
where S is a finite set of subnets, T is a finite set of nodes and
V is a finite set of vulnerabilities. For each node t ∈ T , we
specify one existing attribute and add three attributes: ttype ∈
{Web server (Red Hat), Endpoint (Win10), MRI (Win7), Smart
TV (Samsung), · · · }) specifies the type of the node; tdecoy ∈
{False, T rue} indicates the node is either real or decoy; tpr
∈ (0, 1] refers to the probability that an attacker will interact
with the node and use it as a stepping stone to compromise
other nodes; tcost is the deployment cost of the decoy (i.e., 0
if tdecoy ≡ False).
For tpr , if the node is real, the attacker will have the
probability of 1 to exploit the vulnerabilities and then use it to
compromise other nodes; if the node is a decoy, the attacker
may figure out the trap after the interaction with the node
and then will terminate its activities with the node; or it is
deceived by the decoy and be diverted to other decoy nodes
afterwards. Therefore, the full OS-based decoy will have a
higher probability to deceive attackers than the emulated decoy
as the attacker is more likely to interact with the full OS-based
decoy without detecting the deception. It is also assumed that
the attacker cannot detect the decoy without interacting with
the decoy; this leads to tpr > 0.
1) Deployment Vector: We assume the network is divided
into several VLANs (i.e., subnets). All decoy nodes deployed
across the network have different types. Let Yd denote the set
of node types for deception deployment and Yp denote the
set of the IoT types for patch management. We define the
deployment vector as follows.
Definition 1. The deployment vector dv is defined as an
integer valued vector. The function o : Yd→ {0, 1, 2} describes
the integer value for each type of the decoy deployment in the
network. The function q : Yp → {0, 1} describes an integer
value of the patch solution for each type of IoT nodes in
the network. Let dvd denote the deployment vector for the
deception technology and dvp denote the deployment vector
for the patch management. We denote the deployment vectors
by:
dvd = (o(type1 ), o(type2 ), · · · , o(type|Yd |))
dvp = (q(type1 ), q(type2 ), · · · , q(type |Yp|)) (1)
dv = dvd ∪ dvp
We assume at least one server decoy should be deployed in
the network to engage the attackers. Therefore, for the server
decoy, the integer value indicates that a specific type of server
decoys is not deployed (0), emulated (1) or full OS-based (2).
We use emulated decoys for client machines and IoT devices.
Hence, the integer value indicates that a specific type of decoys
is either deployed (1) or not (0). For the patch management,
the integer value shows that a specific type of the IoT devices
can be either patched (1) or not patched (0).
2) Metrics: We assume that an attacker may have one or
more targets in the network for achieving its goal (e.g., stealing
data stored in servers). For each target, the attacker may be
able to find multiple attack paths to reach the target via one
or multiple entry points. An attack path specifies a sequence
of nodes that the attacker can compromise to reach the target
node. We consider a set of attack paths AP for the attacker to
reach all the targets from all possible entry points. Each attack
path ap ∈ AP is a sequence of nodes along the path. We divide
AP into two sets: APr representing a set of attack paths with
real nodes as targets and APd indicating a set of attack paths
with decoy nodes as targets. As the attacker will terminate its
activities with the decoy upon detecting the deception, APr
only contains the real nodes while APd contains both real
nodes and decoy nodes.
We use the following three metrics to evaluate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the deployed decoy system:
• Decoy Nodes Fraction (DNF ): This metric refers to the
average fraction of decoy nodes among all nodes along
the attack path towards a decoy target, representing the
average decoy percentage along the attack path. Let apdt
denote a set of decoy nodes along an attack path. DNF
is measured by:
DNF (IoT, dv) =
∑
ap∈APd
|apdt |
|ap|
|APd| (2)
where higher DNF is more desirable.
• Node Interaction Probability (NIP ): This metric indicates
the average probability that an attacker will interact with
nodes along a given attack path and eventually reach a
decoy target. This metric reflects the average probability
that the attacker is diverted to the decoy target along the
attack path. NIP is estimated by:
NIP(IoT, dv) =
∑
ap∈APd
∏
t∈ap
tpr
|APd| (3)
where higher NIP is regarded as better performance.
• Fraction of Residual Cost (RCF ): This metric represents
how much cost remains after subtracting one deployment
related cost from the total cost. Here the total cost indi-
cates the cost incurred for deploying all potential defense
mechanisms. To estimate this cost, we assume that the
manufacturer charges the patch management solution for
the same type of IoT devices at a fixed price. We also
assume that all decoys are sufficiently different showing
high diversity, not to be easily detected by attackers. In
order to obtain RCF , we consider three cost related to
defense mechanism deployments as follows:
1) Intelligence Cost (IC): This cost incurs when pur-
chasing the intelligence center as a platform and is
considered as a constant cost in this work.
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2) Total Patch Management Cost (PMC ): This cost
includes the total patch management cost for IoT
devices and is obtained by:
PMC (IoT, dv) =
∑
type∈Yp
q(type)≡1
pmctype
(4)
where pmctype denotes the patch solution cost for
one type of the IoT devices.
3) Decoy Deployment Cost (DC ): This cost considers
the deployment cost of all decoys and is given by:
DC (IoT, dv) =
∑
tdecoy≡True
ttype∈Yd
o(ttype)>0
tcost
(5)
Based on these three costs above (i.e., IC, PMC, and
DC), RCF is computed by:
RCF (IoT, dv) =
TC − (IC +DC + PMC )
TC
(6)
where TC is calculated by summing the associated
costs for all potential defense mechanisms. Higher RCF
indicates lower actual deployment cost, which is more
desirable.
3) Problem Statement: The problem we aim to solve
is an MOO problem where the above three metrics (i.e.,
DNF (IoT , dv), NIP(IoT , dv), RCF (IoT , dv)) should be
maximized.
Given that each deployment of the defense mechanisms en-
tails purchase and maintenance cost, the optimization problem
is to compute a set of Pareto optimal solutions (or Pareto
frontier) [24] that provide a reasonable balance between the
effectiveness and efficiency of the deployments of the defense
mechanisms. Let DV denote all possible deployments of the
defense mechanisms for a given IoT network and PP =
{DNF (IoT , dv), NIP(IoT , dv), RCF (IoT , dv) | dv ∈ DV }
denote all possible values of the evaluation metrics for the
given DV . We define the Pareto optimal solutions (or Pareto
frontier) in our optimization problem as follows.
Definition 2. The Pareto frontier F for the three-objective
optimization problem is {(dnf ∗, nip∗, rcf ∗) ∈ F} ⇐⇒ @
(dnf , nip, rcf ) ∈ F such that dnf ≥ dnf ∗ ∧ nip ≥ nip∗ ∧
rcf ≥ rcf ∗, and dnf > dnf ∗ ∨ nip > nip∗ ∨ rcf > rcf ∗
where * indicates an optimal solution for the objectives and
each (dnf ∗, nip∗, rcf ∗) is a strongly nondominated solution.
B. Optimization Steps
We enhance our prior framework [14] by introducing the
deployment generator, the deployment evaluator and the opti-
mization module. Fig. 1 describes the enhanced, new frame-
work with the following five phases: data input, deployment
generation, security model generation, deployment evaluation,
and deployment optimization.
In Phase 1, the security decision maker provides the IoT
Generator with the system information (i.e., network topology
and node vulnerability information) to construct an IoT net-
work. Given the network and all potential deployments of the
defense mechanisms represented in the integer formats, the
Deployment Generator randomly generates a set of different
deployments in Phase 2. Each deployment of the defense
mechanisms is fed into the network and also passed onto
the Optimization Module. In Phase 3, the Security Model
Generator takes the reconstructed network as input and au-
tomatically generates the HARM which captures all possible
attack paths. We use the three-layered HARM [16] as our
graphical security model. In the three-layered HARM, the
upper layer captures the subnet reachability information, the
middle layer represents the node connectivity information (i.e.,
nodes connected in the topological structure) and the lower
layer denotes the vulnerability information of each node. In
Phase 4, the Deployment Evaluator takes the HARM as input
along with the evaluation metrics and computes the results
which are then fed into the Optimization Module. In Phase
5, based on the initial set of deployments and the associated
evaluation results, the Optimization Module applies the multi-
objective genetic algorithm to compute the optimal deploy-
ments of the defense mechanisms for the IoT network based
on the termination conditions (e.g., the maximum number of
generations defined by the security decision maker).
We chose the GA to solve the given MOO problem due
to the following reasons. First, GA provides a simple way
to encode the candidate solutions. As we use the integer
values to represent the deployment of defense mechanisms,
binary encoding can be easily applied to convert the integer
values into binary values for our defense mechanisms. Second,
due to the rapidly growing IoT network, the scalability of
an algorithm becomes a critical issue. However, GA requires
little information to search effectively in a large search space
which satisfies the requirement of an IoT network with a
large number of nodes. To be specific, we choose one of the
widely used GAs named nondominated sorting GA II (NSGA-
II) in [12] as the optimization algorithm. NSGA-II is defined
as a fast sorting and elite MOGA and is able to find better
spread of the solutions.
V. CASE STUDY
For our case study, we use an example scenario based on
a smart hospital IoT environment. As a hospital system often
keeps highly valuable information, attackers can have high
economic gain by obtaining the private data. We will introduce
the example network and explain each step to solve the given
MOO problem based on our proposed approach. To deliver
a more concrete idea, we are using this scenario to validate
our proposed approach; however, our work is generic in nature
and is applicable to general IoT environments.
A. Example Network
We consider the Picture Archive and Communication Sys-
tem (PACS) in a smart hospital IoT. The system consists
of PACS servers for the storage of image information from
multiple source machine types, PACS client machines to
access the images and Internet of Medical Things (IoMT)
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Fig. 1: Optimization steps in the proposed framework.
using radiology techniques [4, 5] to send images to the servers.
PACS uses the digital imaging and communications in medical
(DICOM) standard as the communication protocol between
the IoMT devices and the PACS servers. Fig. 2 depicts the
example PACS network.
Fig. 2: An example PACS network.
The PACS network is divided into three VLANs by the
external and internal firewalls. The PACS servers use active-
active high availability cluster configuration to ensure reliable
data storage and access. The redundant servers are identical
in terms of both hardware and software. The PACS clients
are computers with the DICOM viewers. The IoMT devices
include Ultrasound machine, MRI machine, digital X-Ray
machine, and CT scanner. As these IoMT devices are closed
systems, additional security software cannot be easily inte-
grated into the devices. Besides, patches for the COTS running
on the IoMT devices need to be verified and tested by the
manufacturers due to the safety issue.
We make assumptions for the operating systems (OSs) and
applications running on the devices: each PACS server runs
a Linux OS and is installed with the PACS software and
database (e.g., MySQL); PACS client machines run two types
of OSs, including Windows 8 and Windows 10; IoMT devices
run Windows 7. All the chosen OSs and applications are
commonly used in the PACS.
We use the attacker model described in Section III-C.
The attacker is able to wrap highly capable attack tools
into obsolete malware (e.g., MS08-067), use it to exploit the
vulnerabilities in the un-patched IoMT devices and become
un-detected by the anti-virus software running on other de-
vices [4, 5]. For the servers and client machines, the known but
un-patched vulnerabilities can be collected from the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD). We assume that the attacker is
able to exploit the client machines and IoMT devices as entry
points, then move laterally in different VLANs of the network,
and eventually reach the servers for stealing private data.
The intelligence center is purchased as a platform and de-
coys are purchased individually with an annual license fee. The
IoMT devices are purchased from different manufacturers. The
hospital has the maintenance support from the manufacturers
for the cleaning, repair and upgrade services but without the
coverage of security updates. Thus, the hospital needs to make
additional contracts with the manufacturers separately for the
patch management support. We investigate the prices of the
deception products [34, 35] and service fees for the IoMT
devices [6, 21, 22, 23]. We consider that the additional patch
management fee is 10% of the average full service fee. The
estimated prices for the defense mechanisms are shown in
Table I.
TABLE I: Estimated prices for defense mechanisms.
Product Price (USD)
• Deception Deployment
Intelligence Center 20,000
PACS Server Full OS (Linux) 1,500Emulation (Linux) 400
PACS Client Windows 8 300
(Emulation) Windows 10 300
Ultrasound 200
IoMT Device MRI 200
(Emulation) X-Ray 200
CT Scanner 200
• Patch Solution
Ultrasound 2,000
IoMT MRI 6,000
Device X-Ray 1,000
CT Scanner 5,000
B. Computation of the Optimal Deployments
We consider a small-scale PACS network, including 2 PACS
servers, 10 PACS client machines (5 running Windows 8 and
5 running Windows 10) and 4 different IoMT devices. The
network is divided into three VLANs: servers in VLAN1,
client machines in VLAN2 and IoMT devices in VLAN3.
We assume each device has one known but un-patched
vulnerability that can be exploited by the attacker to gain
the root permission. Therefore, if the un-patched Windows 7
in the IoMT device is patched, there is no other exploitable
vulnerability. We also assume each decoy has one vulnerability
to lure the attacker. More vulnerabilities can be used based
on the real configuration of the decoys. Besides, for an
emulated decoy, the attacker interacts with the decoy with the
probability of 0.5, can exploit the vulnerability and then use it
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to compromise other devices; for a full OS-based decoy, this
probability is 0.9. We assume that the probability values are
obtainable based on a measurement of the real configuration
of the decoys (e.g., semi-quantitative and semi-qualitative).
Based on the concepts of GA [24], a population represents a
group of potential deployments of the defense mechanisms; a
chromosome corresponds to a deployment vector; a generation
is one time of algorithm iteration; fitness values are determined
by the evaluation metrics (i.e., fitness functions). We use
the following algorithm parameters: population size = 100,
maximum number of generations = 100, crossover rate = 0.8,
and mutation rate = 0.2.
We first generate the PACS network via the IoT
Generator. The network is represented as IoTPACS =
(SPACS , TPACS , VPACS ) where
SPACS = {sVLAN1 , sVLAN2 , sVLAN3},
TPACS = {tsvr1 , tsvr2 , tclt1 , · · · , tclt10 , tiomt1 , · · · , tiomt4}
VPACS = {vsvr1 , vsvr2 , vclt1 , · · · , vclt10 , viomt1 , · · · , viomt4}.
We show a list of attributes for tiomt1 as an example:
tiomt1 type = Ultrasound(Win7); tiomt1decoy = False;
tiomt1pr = 1.0; tiomt1cost = 0.
Given the network, we have the potential deployments of
the defense mechanisms based on the types of devices: Yd
= {PACS server (Linux), PACS client (Win8), PACS client
(Win10), Ultrasound (Win7), MRI (Win7), XRay (Win7), CT
(Win7)} and Yp = {Ultrasound (Win7), MRI (Win7), XRay
(Win7), CT (Win7)}.
Given the potential deployments, we randomly generate
a population of 100 deployments DV PACS . We show one
example of the deployment vector, dv1 = dv1d ∪ dv1p =
(o(PACS server (Linux)), ...) ∪ (q(Ultrasound (Win7)), ...) =
(2, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) ∪ (1, 0, 1, 1) = (2, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1).
Afterwards, the PACS network is reconstructed with the
defense mechanisms. For example, using dv1, three decoy
nodes are added into the network (tsvrd1 , tcltd1 and tiomtd1 )
and three IoMT devices are patched (tiomt1 , tiomt3 and
tiomtd4 ). The reconstructed network is fed into the Security
Model Generator to construct the HARM and to capture the
potential attack paths. We show the HARM for the network
with the deployment vector dv1 in Fig. 3.
From Fig. 3, the attacker is able to take the client machines
in VLAN2 and IoMT devices in VLAN3 as entry points and
then move laterally in the network to eventually reach the
servers. As decoys are also deployed in the network, the
attacker may be lured into the decoys. Once the attacker
interacts with the decoy, it either detects the decoy and
terminates its attack behavior, or is diverted to another decoy.
Then the HARM with the attack path information is taken as
input into the Security Evaluator to evaluate the deployment
of the defense mechanisms. We omit the calculation steps and
results of the evaluation metrics for the network with dv1 due
to the page constraint.
The Optimization Module takes the initial population of
deployments (DV PACS ) and the corresponding fitness values
Fig. 3: HARM for the network with dv1.
(FPACS ) as inputs and then computes the optimal deployments
via the MOGA. We show the final population of the fitness
values in Fig. 4 which forms the Pareto frontier (Fpacs ).
There are four labeled points in Fig. 4 which represent the
deployments with one maximum fitness value respectively. We
show the deployment vector for each point as follows: dvA∗
= (2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), dvB∗ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1), dvC∗ = (2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1) and dvD∗ =
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Points A∗ and B∗ have the maximum decoy node fraction.
In these two deployments, all decoys are deployed and all
IoMT devices are patched. The only difference is that point A∗
represents the deployment with the full OS-based server decoy
and point B∗ represents the one with the emulated server
decoy. Point C∗ has the maximum node interaction probability
and represents the deployment with the full OS-based server
decoy deployed and all the IoMT devices patched. Point E∗
has the maximum residual cost fraction and represents the
deployment with one emulated server decoy deployed. These
deployments will be used to test the algorithm accuracy in
Section VI.
C. Analysis and Comparison of the Defense Mechanisms
In this section, we analyze the optimal deployments of the
defense mechanisms and compare the optimal deployments
with the deployments of the individual defense mechanisms.
We introduce several metrics which are used in the following
analysis: the percentage of decoys among all real devices
(PD), the percentage of patched devices among all real devices
(PPD), the number of attack paths towards the real targets
(NAPRT calculated by |APr|), the number of attack paths
towards the decoy targets (NAPDT calculated by |APd|) and
the deployment cost of the defense mechanisms (DCDM ).
1) Analysis of the Optimal Deployments: We assume the
hospital has a budget for the security investment and uses the
budget and total cost to calculate the minimum residual cost
fraction. Here, we use a budget of $25, 000.00 (in USD) and
calculate the minimum RCF which is approximately 0.322.
We show the deployments meeting the budget constraint in
Fig. 5 (i.e., the points that are above 0.322 in Fig. 4).
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Fig. 4: Final deployments. Fig. 5: Deployments with budget con-straint.
Fig. 6: Complexity: GA vs. ESA.
To balance the effect of the two evaluation metrics in
Fig. 5, we use a common scalarization method [11], which
is a weighted sum to consider both metrics, DNF and NIP ,
where each metric is weighted with β and γ, respectively.
This leads to a single, weighted metric, βDNF + γNIP
(β+γ = 1). We use the weight of β ranged from 0 to 1 (with
the increment of 0.1) and show the points with the maximum
weighted metric in Fig. 5. We summarize the corresponding
deployment vector and the weight values of β for each
point in the following: dvP1 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
with β = 1; dvP2 = (2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) with β =
0, 0.1; dvP3 = (2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) with β = 0.2, 0.3,
04; dvP4 = (2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) with β = 0.5; dvP5 =
(2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0) with β = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9.
Point P1 represents the deployment with the maximum
decoy node fraction. Other points represent the deployments
with one or multiple maximum weight metric values. We
calculate the decoy percentage PD and patch percentage
PPD for each point to indicate the coverage of the defense
mechanisms. We show the values of two evaluation metrics
(DNF and NIP ) and the percentages of each point in Table II
in the order of increasing β.
TABLE II: Comparisons among the optimal deployments.
Point DNF NIP PD PPD
P2 0.388 0.892 12.5% 0.0%
P3 0.414 0.886 12.5% 12.5%
P4 0.431 0.874 18.8% 12.5%
P5 0.482 0.802 43.8% 6.3%
P1 0.483 0.450 31.3% 12.5%
From point P2 to point P4 in Table II, DNF , PD and PPD
increase while NIP decreases with the increasing value of
β, which indicates the higher percentages of the decoys and
the patched IoMT devices, and the higher decoy authenticity
(deployment of the full OS-based server decoy) when the
importance of DNF increases. Point P5 has the maximum
PD , relatively high values of DNF and NIP and a low value
of PPD , which demonstrates the maximum percentage of the
decoys, high decoy authenticity but a low percentage of the
patched IoMT devices. Point P1 has the maximum DNF and
PPD , a low value of NIP and a relatively high value of
PD , which demonstrates the high percentages of the decoys
and the patched IoMT devices but a low decoy authenticity
(deployment of all emulated decoys).
Among the points P1, P2, P3 and P4, we can see that
there is a balance between the decoy percentage and decoy
authenticity. Point P1 has a good percentage of the decoys
(more decoys to trap the attackers) but low authenticity of
the decoys (lower probability to interact with the attackers
once they are diverted to the server decoy) while the other
three points have the opposite effect. Point P5 achieves a good
percentage of the decoy and high authenticity of the decoys but
has a low percentage of the patched IoMT devices. Besides,
points P1, P3 and P4 have a good patch percentage. In order
to facilitate the decision making on the optimal deployment
of the defense mechanisms by the defenders, we summarize
the analysis results in the following way: (2) choose the
deployment using dvP5 to achieve high decoy coverage and
decoy authenticity; (2) choose the deployment using dvP1 to
achieve high decoy coverage and patch coverage; and (3)
choose the deployment using dvP4 to achieve high decoy
authenticity and patch coverage.
2) Comparison of the Defense Mechanisms: We compare
the three optimal deployments of the two defense mechanisms
with the deployments of only deception or only patch solution
in Table III using PD , PPD , NAPRT , NAPDT and DCDM .
Additionally, we patch all the IoMT devices by using only
patch solution and deploy the full OS-based server decoy
and all the other potential decoys by using only deception
mechanism.
TABLE III: Comparisons among the deployments.
Defense
Metric
PD PPD NAPRT NAPDT DCDM
No defense 0.0% 0.0% 108 0 0
Only patch 0.0% 25.0% 20 0 14000
Only deception 43.8% 0.0% 108 68 22900
Both with dvP1 31.3% 12.5% 64 40 24400
Both with dvP4 18.8% 12.5% 64 34 24900
Both with dvP5 43.8% 6.3% 86 55 23900
From Table III, compared with no defense, different com-
binations of the defense mechanisms increase the security of
the IoT network at different aspects. The deployment of patch
solution has the highest patch percentage and lowest number
of real attack paths. However, once the attacker breaks into
the network, the real devices are the only targets and the
behavior of sophisticated attackers may not be detected. The
deployment of deception has the highest decoy percentage
and highest number of fake attack paths but remains the
highest number of real attack paths. The deployments of both
patch and deception decrease the number of real attack paths
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significantly and introduce the fake attack paths to divert the
attacks from the real assets. Therefore, the combinations of
the two defense mechanisms are more effective to increase
the security of the IoT networks with a reasonable cost.
Defenders could use our approach to compute the set of
optimal deployments of the combined defense mechanisms
and choose the most suitable deployment based on the budget
constraint and analysis metrics.
VI. SIMULATIONS
We compare the GA with the exhaustive search algorithm
(ESA) in terms of time efficiency and accuracy of the results.
Here the accuracy refers to the ratio between the number of
deployments with the maximum fitness value of one fitness
function in the final population using the GA and that in Pareto
frontier using the ESA. All simulations are performed using
the computer equipped with a 3.4 GHz CPU under Linux Mint
18.1 Serena and Eclipse Neon.1 with Python 2.7.
We consider the IoT networks with the similar structure
of the example network used in the case study along with
the attacker model in Section III-C. We use the network
with a fixed number of servers and client machines and an
increasing number of the IoT devices with different types
to investigate the impact of the growing IoT devices on the
proposed approach. Specifically, we use 2 servers, 50 client
machines with two types of OSs. The number of IoT devices
ranges from 50 to 200 with an increment of 25 in each
simulation. Servers, client machines and different types of
the IoT devices are deployed in different VLANs. We assume
every 25 IoT devices have the same type and belong to the
same manufacturer. Each manufacturer makes agreement with
the enterprise to implement the patch solutions for the IoT
devices at a different price (ranging from 1000 to 4000 with a
difference of 500 for each agreement). Prices for the deception
products are same as the prices shown in Table I. We use the
following algorithm parameters for the simulations: population
size = 100, maximum number of generations = 100, crossover
rate = 0.8 and mutation rate = 0.2.
We show the time comparison of two algorithms in Fig. 6.
We use the number of nodes with different types (in the form
of server-client machine-IoT) along with the number of bits
used for the binary encodings of the deployments as labels.
Initially, when the scale of the network is small, the ESA runs
faster than the GA. However, with the increasing number of
the encoding bits, the time of the ESA increases exponentially
while the time of the GA increases linearly.
We show the accuracy ratios of the GA compared with
the ESA in Table IV. When the number of the encoding bits
ranges from 8 to 14, the accuracy ratio is 1.0 as the set of the
deployments with one maximum fitness value calculated by
the GA is equal to the set of deployments with one maximum
value calculated by the ESA. The ratio decreases when the
number of the encoding bits is equal to or larger than 16.
We increase the population size and the maximum generation
of GA and run the simulations with the same networks. For
the network with 2 servers, 50 client machines and 150 IoT
devices, we keep the current population size while increase the
maximum generation to 150; for the network with 175 IoT
devices, we increase the population size and the maximum
generation to 150; for the network with 200 IoT devices,
we increase the population size to 150 and the maximum
generation to 200. We obtain the ratios of 1.0 for all these
networks with a slightly higher runtime.
TABLE IV: Accuracy ratios of GA.
Network Population Maximum Runtime Accuracysize generation (minute) ratio
2-50-50 (8) 100 100 4 1.0
2-50-75 (10) 100 100 7 1.0
2-50-100 (12) 100 100 9 1.0
2-50-125 (14) 100 100 12 1.0
2-50-150 (16) 100 100 16 0.75100 150 22 1.0
2-50-175 (18) 100 100 20 0.75150 150 40 1.0
2-50-200 (20) 100 100 22 0.5150 200 67 1.0
In conclusion, the GA is much more efficient than the ESA
when the size of the IoT network increases and is able to obtain
a good spread of the optimal deployments within a reasonable
time.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
The proposed approach can be applied to any IoT net-
works with the potential deployments of these two defense
mechanisms. However, by designing new evaluation metrics
and integrating them with the graphical security model, our
approach can be used to investigate any combinations of the
defense mechanisms. In our future work, we could use more
case studies to analyze the effect of the defense mechanisms
and apply game theoretic approach to model the interaction
between the defender who tries to deploy optimal defenses
and attacker who tries to strategically evade the defenses [18].
Besides, several limitations can be resolved to extend the scope
of the work.
• Deployment cost: We will consider the long-term effect
of the annual fees on the deployment costs of both the
deception and security patch mechanisms.
• Deception: The attacker may not choose the particular
decoy IoT device among all IoT devices. We will inves-
tigate the effectiveness and efficiency of the deployments
with the various numbers of decoys for each IoT type.
• Optimization algorithms: We will validate whether opti-
mal solutions are identified using GA via simulations and
evaluate and compare other heuristic algorithms to find
the most efficient algorithm for our optimization problem.
• Validation: We introduced a case study to demonstrate
the feasibility of our proposed approach and carried out
simulations to evaluate the efficiency of the optimization
algorithm. We will perform the experiment on a small-
scale IoT network to verify the approach.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided a novel approach to compute
the optimal deployments of defense mechanisms for IoT
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environments. We have introduced two defense mechanisms,
including the modern deception technology and patch man-
agement solution for IoT devices. We have defined three
metrics to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the
deployments of defense mechanisms and formalized a multi-
objective optimization (MOO) problem to maximize three
devised metrics as system goals. We have leveraged the genetic
algorithm to solve the MOO problem and integrated it with the
graphical security model along with the deployment evaluator
in the framework to carry out the computation of optimal
deployments of defense mechanisms. We have validated the
performance of the proposed approach based on a case study
with a smart hospital IoT scenario. Through the extensive sim-
ulation experiments, we have validated the performance of the
proposed framework and deployment method by conducting a
comparative analysis between the genetic algorithm and the
exhaustive search algorithm in terms of runtime complexity
and optimality (or accuracy). Our simulation results have
shown that the GA generates high quality solutions with low
complexity, by showing a good spread of the deployments of
defense mechanisms.
REFERENCES
[1] “Know What is Lurking in Your Network,” Attivo, Tech. Rep.,
2016.
[2] “On the Radar: Attivo Networks offers deception, vulnerability
assessment, and response automation,” Ovum, Tech. Rep., 2017.
[3] “On the Radar: TopSpin adds IoT security capabilities to
DECOYnet,” Ovum, Tech. Rep., 2017.
[4] “ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK MEDJACK (Medical Device
Hijack),” TrapX Research Labs, Tech. Rep., 2017.
[5] “ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK MEDJACK.2 Hospitals Under
Siege,” TrapX Research Labs, Tech. Rep., 2017.
[6] (2017) How Much Does an Ultrasound Machine
Cost? [Online]. Available: http://www.costowl.com/healthcare/
healthcare-ultrasound-machine-costs.html
[7] “Product Brief - DeceptionGrid 6.0,” TrapX Research Labs,
Tech. Rep., 2017.
[8] “Retail Point-of-Sale Under Fire,” TrapX Research Labs, Tech.
Rep., 2017.
[9] M. Anirudh, S. A. Thileeban, and D. J. Nallathambi, “Use of
honeypots for mitigating DoS attacks targeted on IoT networks,”
in Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Com-
puter, Communication and Signal Processing (ICCCSP ’17).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–4.
[10] D. Borbor, L. Wang, S. Jajodia, and A. Singhal, Securing
Networks Against Unpatchable and Unknown Vulnerabilities
Using Heterogeneous Hardening Options. Springer Interna-
tional Publishing, 2017, pp. 509–528.
[11] J. H. Cho, Y. Wang, I. R. Chen, K. S. Chan, and A. Swami, “A
survey on modeling and optimizing multi-objective systems,”
IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 3, pp.
1867–1901, Third Quarter 2017.
[12] K. Deb, A. Pratap, S. Agarwal, and T. Meyarivan, “A Fast
and Elitist Multiobjective Genetic Algorithm: NSGA-II,” IEEE
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 6, no. 2, pp.
182–197, 2002.
[13] S. Dowling, M. Schukat, and H. Melvin, “A ZigBee Honeypot
to assess IoT Cyberattack Behaviour,” in Proceedings of the
2017 28th Irish Signals and Systems Conference (ISSC ’17).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[14] M. Ge, J. B. Hong, W. Guttmann, and D. S. Kim, “A framework
for automating security analysis of the internet of things,”
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 83, pp.
12–27, 2017.
[15] J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, and M. Palaniswami, “Internet
of Things (IoT): A Vision, Architectural Elements, and Future
Directions,” Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 29,
no. 7, pp. 1645–1660, 2013.
[16] J. B. Hong and D. S. Kim, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Mov-
ing Target Defenses using Security Models,” IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 163–
177, 2015.
[17] ——, “Towards Scalable Security Analysis using Multi-Layered
Security Models,” Journal of Network and Computer Applica-
tions, vol. 75, pp. 156–168, 2016.
[18] G. Kamdem, C. Kamhoua, Y. Lu, S. Shetty, and L. Njilla, “A
Markov Game Theoritic Approach for Power Grid Security,”
in Proceedings of 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference
on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW ’17).
IEEE, 2017, pp. 139–144.
[19] C. Kolias, G. Kambourakis, A. Stavrou, and J. Voas, “DDoS
in the IoT: Mirai and Other Botnets,” IEEE Computer, vol. 50,
no. 7, pp. 80–84, 2017.
[20] Q. D. La, T. Q. S. Quek, J. Lee, S. Jin, and H. Zhu, “Deceptive
Attack and Defense Game in Honeypot-Enabled Networks for
the Internet of Things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 3,
no. 6, pp. 1025–1035, 2016.
[21] S. Loomis. (2017) CT Scanner Service Cost Price Info.
[Online]. Available: https://info.blockimaging.com/bid/95421/
ct-scanner-service-cost-price-info
[22] ——. (2016) MRI Service Cost Price Info. [Online]. Available:
https://info.blockimaging.com/mri-service-cost-price-info
[23] ——. (2016) X-Ray Equipment Service Cost Price
Info. [Online]. Available: https://info.blockimaging.com/
x-ray-equipment-service-cost-price-info
[24] R. T. Marler and J. S. Arora, “Survey of multi-objective
optimization methods for engineering,” Structural and Multi-
disciplinary Optimization, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 369–395, 2004.
[25] Y. M. P. Pa, S. Suzuki, K. Yoshioka, T. Matsumoto, T. Kasama,
and C. Rossow, “IoTPOT: Analysing the Rise of IoT Com-
promises,” in Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Workshop on
Offensive Technologies (WOOT ’15). USENIX Association,
2015.
[26] L. Pingree. (2016) Emerging Technology Analysis:
Deception Techniques and Technologies Create Security
Technology Business Opportunities. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-2LSQOX3&
ct=150824&st=sb&aliId=87768
[27] R. Roman, P. Najera, and J. Lopez, “Securing the Internet of
Things,” Computer, vol. 44, no. 9, pp. 51–58, Sep. 2011.
[28] R. Roman, J. Zhou, and J. Lopez, “On the features and chal-
lenges of security and privacy in distributed internet of things,”
Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 2266–2279, 2013.
[29] A. Rullo, E. Serra, E. Bertino, and J. Lobo, “Shortfall-Based
Optimal Security Provisioning for Internet of Things,” in Pro-
ceedings of 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on Dis-
tributed Computing Systems (ICDCS ’17). IEEE, 2017, pp.
2585–2586.
[30] A. Rullo, D. Midi, E. Serra, and E. Bertino, “Pareto Optimal
Security Resource Allocation for Internet of Things,” ACM
Transactions on Privacy & Security, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 15:1–
15:30, Oct. 2017.
[31] V. Saini, Q. Duan, and V. Paruchuri, “Threat Modeling using
Attack Trees,” Journal of Computer Science in Colleges, vol. 23,
no. 4, pp. 124–131, 2008.
[32] O. Sheyner, J. Haines, S. Jha, R. Lippmann, and J. M. Wing,
“Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs,” in
Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP ’02). IEEE Computer Society, 2002, pp. 273–
284.
[33] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, “Secu-
rity, privacy and trust in Internet of Things: The road ahead,”
Computer Networks, vol. 76, pp. 146–164, 2015.
[34] P. Stephenson. (2016) Attivo BOTsink Deception
Platform. [Online]. Available: https://www.scmagazine.com/
attivo-botsink-deception-platform/review/7062/
[35] ——. (2017) TrapX Security’s Deception-
Grid. [Online]. Available: https://www.scmagazine.com/
trapx-securitys-deceptiongrid/article/681820/
10
